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RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS.
FIRST ARTICLE.
"Jus privatum sub tutela jurils pubriel latet."
A detailed exposition of all the points of law fiftecting railroad
companies, would not, if it were practicable, be consistent either
with the objects or the limits of an article. On the other hand,
to discuss some single question, taken at random, would, in pro-
priety, involve a change of title. The difficulty may perhaps be
best overcome by selecting a part of the subject, of sufficient in-
trinsic importance, and so distinctive that the principles found to
determine it, shall be susceptible of a general application.
But its extensiveness is not the only embarrassing circumstance
&ttending ", Railroad Law." In England, Parliament has assumed
the duty of regulating the whole matter of the construction and
management of railways, down to the most minute particulars:
Syvorsis.-The subject-its extensiveness-its peculiar difficulties. Complex
nature of the railroad corporation: Distinctive character owing to the railroad.
What is a railroad? Corporation's interest in the land, not in general an easement,
but an estate. Qumre, as to original proprietor's right of entry for condition.
broken. Whether there is a public interest in the road protecting it against seizure
by creditors and voluntary alienation. State vs. Rives: two premises. Examina-
tion of lst-corporation's estate in any land-Coke's doctrine : Stat. do Terr. Tem-
plariorum: application to railroad. 2d premises: The great issue. Are railroads
highways ? Position of authorities: Reasons on negative side and answers. Two
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nothing has been left to the courts but to interpret the statutes-
little to text-writers, but to make convenient indices to them. But
among us no such complete system exists; and if the legislative
authority should hereafter undertake its formation, the independent
movement of so many States must prevent an uniformity of execu-
tion. In what has been done, much diversity is apparent. Yet the
subject owes its origin to the statute book, and cannot be considered
altogether apart from it. As the case stands, legislation, content
with having brought into being a creature, whose like was never
before seen on earth, leaves it to common law to show, if it can,
how that which seems a monster may be made a tame and decorous
public servant.
Corporations, as such, have become familiar to the law, and if
there were any class among them to which this nondescript could
be referred, it would be comparatively easy to deal with it. Then,
the only labor would be, that of accurately noting exceptional pecu-
liarities. But the railroad corporation differs generically from all
other artificial persons. Not a public body, it is yet vested with
powers that cannot readily be distinguished from attributes of sove-
reignty. If any thing seems to be under the immediate control of
the State, it is the public way which affords a common passage
from one border of the land to the other; but who now travels
except on the railway? No wonder that those who govern the
substitute with a more absolute authority than the king himself used
to exercise over his proper highway, should be looked upon as public
functionaries. This natural impression.has the countenance of the
capacities with which a railroad corporation is invested; neither of them separately
affects the road with liability to alienation-both conjoined cannot.
Result of investigation expressed in three propositions. Principles applied to
specific cases. Mortgages of railroads. Mortgages under legislative authority-to
the State-to individuals and corporations. The corporation's public office-how
far it affects its private rights and liabilities. Use of steam: Question of evidence:
Massachusetts law. Taxation. The corporation as common carrier. Qure as to
supposed agreement of English and American law with regard to burden of proof in
questions of negligence. Exclusive possession of road increases the corporation's
liability. Laying out of railroads. British policy: rules for estimating compen-
sation-difference with respect to set-off of advantages. Conclusion.
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Supreme Court of South Carolina, who have held that a railroad
corporation is in fact the mere agent of the State.' The English
companies, during the period of their infancy expressly claimed to
act in this capacity, and they did so in order that the land owners
might submit without murmuring to what was declared to be a
direct exertion of imperial power. The result has been curious.2
Parliament took them at their word. "You are our servants and
we will forever hold you to the condition of servants." To the
spirit of close and jealous surveillance appropriate to the relation
thus established, is due that remarkable series of acts which make
up what may fitly be called the Railway Code of England. Whether
the government has by this means gained a new and potent engine
which may sometimes prove as dangerous to public liberty as it is
now serviceable to public convenience, is a question of politics in
which we happily have an interest only as spectators.
But the railroad corporation presents also another aspect. Those
extensive works which, when contemplated in the aggregate, excite
a double amazement by their unparalelled grandeur and their
wide beneficence, are recognized on near approach, to originate in
concentrated selfishness. We see a trading company, characterized
like other bodies whose only animating principle is the instinct of
acquisition, by much indifference to the rights of others, and by
frequent persistence in profitable wrong-doing.
To discover a theory which shall reconcile these opposite qualities,
is the problem whose solution is essential to a clear understanding
of any right or of any liability of a railroad corporation. That
the task is of acknowedged difficulty, is perhaps no great objection;
since this circumstance not only furnishes an incitement to effort
but gives reason to hope that indulgence will be extended to specu-
lation which otherwise might be obnoxious to censure as crude and
presumptuous.
A railroad corporation may be classed in some respects with the
proprietor of a line of stage coaches; viewed in another light, it
resembles a turnpike company; and thirdly, regarded in its capa-
I Rice's R. 883. 211 Jur. part 2d, 101.
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city of possessing land which has been taken by public authority to
be applied to purposes connected with the public welfare, it finds an
humble type in the owner of a grist mill. The knot which binds
together all these attributes-that which gives to this corporation,
not merely its name, but its character, is the railroad. What is a
railroad ?
It is proposed to consider the nature of the interest which a rail-
road corporation has in the land on which the road is laid, and of
the franchises which accompany the use and occupation of that
land.
In the immediate course of the investigation, not a few important
and unsettled practical questions will be found to offer themselves
for examination ; and if any definite conclusion shall fortunately be
arrived at, it will afford a vantage ground from which it may be
possible to take a comprehensive and consistent view of some of the
other questions affecting these companies in their relations as well
to the public as to individuals.
What is the tenure by which the soil of the railroad is held?
It is asserted on the one side, that the corporation possesses it in
absolute and unconditional fee; that the whole, or any part may be
pledged or aliened; that it is liable like other lands to be taken on
execution and sold; and that the purchaser at such a sale will re-
ceive it discharged of all duties which are attendant upon it in the
hands of the corporation.
On the other side, various positions have been assumed. It has
been urged that the State can only acquire an easement in the
lands upon which it exercises its right of eminent domain; and that
a railroad corporation, holding under the State, likewise obtains a
mere easement. But it is by no means obvious what is to prevent
the State, as judge of how much the public need requires, from
taking to itself if it choose, the fee as well as an easement. There
is certainly nothing in the nature of a highway making it indispen-
sable that some interest in it should be held by private persons, for
Hale declares that the soil of all navigable. rivers (which are true
highways) belongs prima facie to the king "in point of property as
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rell as franchises."'  With respect to railroads, it is true that in
some States the power of forcible seizure extends only to an ease-
ment. But companies often purchase without having to resort to
their compulsory authority, and it seems no where to be understood
that the legislature forbids the acquisition by this means of an estate
in the land. A railroad corporation must therefore almost inva-
riably own the soil of part of its road, and may own that of the
whole. Furthermore, in England, and probably in most of the
United States, railroad corporations are invested with power to
acquire by compulsory process a freehold interest in land needed for
the road; while the language of courts leaves no room for main-
taining that there is any legal principle to interfere with the com-
plete execution of such a power when granted. 2 It is impossible
then,' to adopt the basis of argument assumed no long time since in
a highly respectable quarter where it was asserted as an universal
truth that railroad corporations obtain no more than an easement.
3
The paper referred to appears to be open to the criticism that in it
Ceasement " and "1 estate upon condition " are used as convertible
terms. One case or the other must be taken as a type ; we must sup-
pose either that the corporation has merely the right of way and
its incidents, or that it possesses an estate in the land. The latter
hypothesis deserves preference, as well because it more generally
corresponds with the reality, as because it involves the more nume-
rous and weighty difficulties. Throughout this essay, therefore,
except where express reference is made to the case of an easement,
the railroad corporation will be regarded as possessing the owner-
ship of the soil occupied for the purposes of the road.
A second point raised is, that the corporation, in attempting to
alien its land, ivso facto terminates its existence, so that the land,
instead of passing by the conveyance, reverts instantly to the origi-
nal grantor. But the operation of the company's grant-and a
I 1 De Jore Maris, 1 cap. vi.
28 Vict. cap. 18, s. 75; Laws of N. Y. 1847, p. 123, 4; 4 Paige, 884, 393 ; 20 Johns.
735; 11 Leigh, 76.
3 28 Am. Jur. Article on R. R. mortgages.
134 RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS.
forced sale by the hands of the sheriff stands on the same footing-
is, either to convey the estate out of the company, or not. If the
former, the fee has become vested in the grantee, and the question
of dissolution cannot affect it. If, on the other hand, the convey-
ance be void, the cause of dissolution never arose. There seems to
be no way of escaping the dilemma, unless the law acknowledges
what metaphysics deny, that a thing can both be and not be at the
same moment. Without stopping, then, to examine how far Slee
vs. Bloom,' where a decision of Chan. Kent was overruled, can be
reconciled with other authorities, this point may safely be dismissed.
Thirdly, it has been contended that since the corporation pur-
chases in virtue of the charter, which enjoins the construction and
maintenance of a road upon the soil, the law will imply a condition
in the grant that the land is to be devoted to this purpose.2 There
is undoubtedly much force in this, and it is at least a question sus-
ceptible of being mooted, whether the original proprietor, coming
forward and claiming to have the charter considered as a part of his
deed, might not recover from the company's grantee (the State not
interfering) both the freehold and all wood, iron, &c., annexed to
it. Yet a remedy of this sort, supposing it capable of being effected,
would only be private and partial. Does not the law provide any
way for preserving the use of the entire road to the community at
large, who are so deeply interested in its permanence ?
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has answered in the nega-
tive2 Against this direct authority are found only occasional vague
questionings, and -a certain feeling of doubt on the part of the bar.
Nothing has appeared in print, so far as the present writer is aware,
controverting State vs. .Rives. On the other hand, an article sup-
porting the opinion of the court in that case, written possibly by
one of the defendant's counsel, has been published in the American
Law Journal. The volume containing it (the 4th or 5th) not being
within reach, it cannot be ascertained whether the author adds any
reasons to those advanced by the court.4 The latter, whose opinion
19 Johns. R. 456. 2 1 Whart. 410, contra. 3 5 Ired. Law R. 307.
4 The 4 Am. Law Mag. 254, contains the article referred to, which will repay
perusal.-Eds Am. Law. Beg.
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is given by Ruffin, 0. J., take a ground which is simple and intelli-
gible. Lands, say the court in substance, which come into posses-
sion of a corporation do not thereby lose any of the incidents which
before belonged to them, nor does the fact that the corporation con-
tributes greatly to public prosperity, exempt its property from any
of the claims which its transactions with individuals give rise to.
This is the general rule applicable to all the property of all cor-
porations ; and, continue the court, coming to the second division
of the argument, there is nothing in the nature of a railroad to
render it an exception.
Let us look for awhile at the first of these two points-the general
principle. The estate which a corporation has in any land, (say the
books,) is of an anomalous kind. At the dissolution of the corpora-
tion, the lands in its possession, instead of escheating to the lord
or to the sovereign, revert to the several grantors, from whom it
received them.
Blackstone1 calls this a life estate terminating by its regular limi-
tation; but such an explanation by no means clears away the diffi-
culties of the case. A grantee of the corporation takes an estate
in fee simple, yet how can a tenant for life lawfully demise a larger
estate than he himself is seized of ? Blackstone gives a much more
accurate description in another place,' where he says, speaking of
the reversion of a corporation's land to the donor, "this is perhaps
the only instance where a reversion can be expectant on a grant in
fee simple." This exception to the course of law would seem to
have been adopted on the sole authority of Lord Coke: "In the
case of a body politic or incorporate, the fee simple is invested in
their politic or incorporate capacity created by the policy of man,
and therefore the law doth annex this condition to every such gift
and grant, that if such body politic or incorporate be dissolved, the
donor or grantor shall re-enter, for that the cause of the gift or
grant faileth.3 Coke says nothing about the effect of a grant over
before dissolution. The old case of Southwell vs. Wade,4 which is
1 Black. Comm. 484. 3 Co. Litt. 136.
2 Black. Comm. 256. 'Popham, 91; 1 Roll. Abr. 816.
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usually referred to as establishing that dissolution, does not affect
land previously demised, and which is cited by Hargraye as contra-
dicting Coke, appears to have related to a thing not lying in tenure,
and therefore not at any rate subject to escheat. Indeed, the report
of the case in Topham might well leave a question whether it either
impugns Coke's doctrine, or makes an exception to it. In Rolle's
Abridgement, it is true, the heads of the decision are stated in much
broader and stronger terms. It is not unworthy of remark that
Rolle applies the word escheat as well to the case of a reversion to
the donor as to escheats proper, or that lapse into the hands of the
lord, which occurs when a tenant of the fee dies without heirs ; and
Flintoff following Preston, observes that this reversion of a corpora-
tion's lands is of the self-same nature as escheat, the mesne grantor
being substituted for the lord, and may be a relic of the practice of
unlimited sub-infeudation so prevalent until interrupted by the
statute of Quia Emptores. Hargrave refers to Sir Matthew Hale's
MSS. for cases going to show, in opposition to Coke, that lands of
bodies corporate are not exempted from escheat. The great author
of the Institutes himself cites the statute De Terris Templairiorum,
17 Ed. 2. Now, the preamble to that statute sets forth that the
order of Templars having been dissolved, the question arose whether
the lords of whom they had held might take their lands as by escheat,
and that this question being referred to all the justices, they had
pronounced that the king and other lords "1 well and lawfully might
take and retain the aforesaid tenements as their escheats." Here,
then, we have a formal adjudication to the effect that in the time of
Edward II. the law was not as it is stated by Coke. The statute
goes on to say, that the lands above mentioned having been given to
the Templars for the defence of Christendom, the king and the
other lords to whom the seigniory belonged, being assembled in par-
liament, were pleased to enact o salutem animarum et ob conscientim
serenationem, that the pious purpose of the donors ought not to be
defeated, and that these lands sh6uld accordingly be to the Knights
of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem, they being, like the late
order of Templars, devoted to the defence of Christians and of the
Holy Church.
RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS. 13T
This disposition 'f the Templar's lands has something more
than an historical interest. Does it not throw light on that which
Coke leaves unexplained, the reasonwhy the lands of corporations
came to be exempted from escheat? In this remarkable statutewe
see the common law meeting a new case and deciding it in perfect
conformity to its regular operation; and we see, also, how another
influence interposed and made an exception, which, singularly
enough, has been followed where the parliamentary authority was
wanting, while the common law adjudication, which the statute
itself records, has been lost sight of, or disregarded. At that early
age, almost all the instances of bodies corporate to be met with were
either religious and charitable, or municipal; and even these latter
seldom received grants of laud for any other than charitable uses.
The grants were voluntary. A condition went with them, which
the law had merely to enforce, not invent; nor could this condition
have had originally the form into which Coke converts it. What
was uppermost in the mind of the penitent knight when he bestowed
a share of his broad lands upon the neighboring abbey, to be so
used as to make annual expiation for the deeds of violence and
bloodshed by means of which he had won them, was no anxious
desire that those lands should revert, on the happening of a con-
tingency, to his heir of the third, or fifth, or tenth generation. Nor
certainly, if any uneasiness affected him, would it have been allayed
by contemplating the probable defeat of the penalty of mis-appro-
priation by a demise over to some lay stranger. Yet, we can easily
imagine it might have been a perfect relief to know, that when the
corporation he had -selected as the trustee of his bounty should be
about to expire, the gift would be so transferred as to carry out
the original intention. The disposition of parliament, and of courts-
when the policy that dictated the statutes of mortmain was not at
work-must have been to see the lands applied to the pious uses for.
which they were granted, and to consider the question of alienation
of importance only as it bore on the real condition of the grant.
The spirit which gave rise to the spirit of cy-pres is much older than
either The Attorney General vs. Syderfin, or Frier vs. Peacock.
A railroad corporation does not receive its lands for the execution
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of a charitable purpose; yet, since the taking is compulsory, it may
fairly be urged that the reason for enforcing the condition of the
grant is not less strong in this case than in that of the endowment
of an abbey or hospital. If the creditors of the company may break
up the line of the road into fragments; if the company itself have
power to alien the separate portions by way of mortgage, or other-
wise, the condition is clearly made to fail; and there would be the
same ground as in the matter of a charity, for the interposition of
the sovereign power, speaking either through judiciary or legisla-
ture. When, therefore, the principles out of which the commonly
received rules respecting the real estate of corporations have grown,
are applied to the railroad, we find they require it to be regarded
in a different light, and treated in a different manner from ordinary
lands. Perhaps, no very great stress ought to be laid on these
analogies, yet, if it be true, that all real estate held by corporations,
differs in an extraordinary particular from real estate in the posses-
sion of a natural person, and that the reason in which this pecu-
liarity originated would make, if carried out, a further difference in
favor of the land on which a chartered railway is constructed, we
would appear to have found something which, even as a direct argu-
ment, is of no contemptible value. All that is now asked, however,
is simply to have it noted that there exists, between a railroad and
other lands owned by the same company, a distinction quite inde-
pendent of the nature of the use to which the railroad is applied.
Even the first premise, then, of the argument on which State vs. Rives
is founded, is not free from doubt. Without going further, we are
able to perceive that to show a railroad to be land owned by a cor-
poration, is not sufficient to establish its liability to the incidents of
other lands.
We come now to the second point made by the court in that case;
and here lies the real issue. These great roads, which disregard
alike political and natural obstacles ; which threaten to pierce every
high hill-to wind into every secluded valley ; from whose approach
no man, if he would, can fly; are they, or are they not, public
highways?
On the authorities the question appears to stand thus : The court
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of North Carolina, in effect withdrawing from a position which it
once defended with pre-eminent energy, must be understood as posi-
tively deciding that they are not public highways.' The Supreme
Court of Mississippi shows a disposition to follow North Carolina.2
In a New York case, Gridley, J. remarked, that "a railroad is in
no sense a public highway."3
The constant language of the English courts implies a different
view. In the case of The ing vs. Severn and Wye B. Co.,4 it
was plainly assumed that a railroad is a public highway.
As for American cases, Bonaparte vs. Camden and Amboy 1.R.
Co.' and Railroad Co. vs. Chappell,6 are very explicit; and other
courts have not failed to speak to a similar purport.7 The acts of incor-
poration frequently describe the roads to be constructed, as highways.,
When- express declaratory terms do not appear, the provisions of
the act respecting the management and final disposition of the road
are often of a nature to show very conclusively its public character.
Such, for example, as provisions for the payment into the public
treasury of all the net income exceeding a certain percentage on
the capital stock, and for securing to the State the power to pur-
chase the entire interest of the company. So contrary is it to the
innate feeling of the sacredness of private property to conceive that
the State, after forcibly taking the land of an individual, in the name
of the general good, can allow it to be diverted to an inferior object,
that the Supreme Court of North Carolina was led in a previous
case,9 as we have seen, to fall into the common mode of speaking.
Even now, when it is proceeding to decide the opposite way, it
seems to feel that there is need of argument to counteract a pre-
existing presumption.
It may be proper, in this place, to examine briefly some of
the principal reasons which can be urged, why the railroad
ought not to be considered a highway. First, it is objected
15 Ired. L. R. 807. 2 9 SM. & M. 481. 3 3 Barb. 468.
4 2 Barn. & Aid. 646. 5 1 Bald. C. C. R. 205. 6 Rice R. 883.
7 3 Paige, 45--74; 8 Harr. Pa. R. 836; 8 Dana, 276.
8 For examples, see N. J. and Penn. Charters, 9 2 Dev. & Bat. 451.
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that all persons are not permitted to travel upon it in their
own vehicles. To this it might be replied, that such a right
has not been altogether wanting in more than one State.' In Eng-
land it not only exists universally, but is sometimes exercised.2
But there is little need to resort to any subterfuge. Restrictions
upon the manner of use are not peculiar to this case: all highways
have been subject to more or less government. The rules fre-
quently enforced on turnpike roads respecting the weight of load,
dimensions of wheel-tires, the mode in which vehicles are to pass
each other, &c., are instances in point. All these provisions have
had reference to public convenience and safety. Now, here is a
highway which cannot be used without great inconvenience and
great danger, unless additional regulations are made. Even then
were the road, when completed, thrown open to all men by procla-
mation, it is evident that all could not in the same manner partici-
pate in its use. The transportation of passengers and freight, if
no longer a monopoly, must fall into the hands of a comparatively
small number of carriers. Mr. Justice Baldwin's criterion of a
public highway is the true one: "Can the public participate in its
use by right, or only by permission ?" It is remarkable that the
very definition given by the North Carolina court, with the pur-
pose of excluding the railroad, fails to do so :-" A common public
highway, on which all citizens are free to pass." While the
nature of this mode of conveyance renders some restriction indis-
pensable, no more is imposed than is absolutely necessary. A man
may still, if he please, take his horse and chaise, as well as his own
person, over the road. All that is enjoined is, that he take them
in a prescribed manner. One species of property we have long
I See Report on Railways, submitted to the Senate of Massachusetts, February
3d, 1837. If the able argument in this report had gone on a step further, and
shown that railroads are not only applied to a public use, but to a public use of a
particular kind, any discussion of the present topic would be superfluous. See also
Laws of Pennsylvania, 1842, p. 366-368. A provision in Rhode Island Charter,
similar to that formerly in force in Massachusetts, appears to be still unrepealed.
2 4 Ad. & E., N. S. 18; 3 Jur. 103.
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been accustomed to see carried in a way provided and regulated by
law. The mails are open to all, yet the contractor who transmits
them-whatever be the mode of his compensation-enjoys a real
monopoly. Less than a hundred and fifty years ago, the Virginia
planter used to attach shafts to a tobacco hogshead, and then,
mounting negroes on horses geared tandem, would send a portion
of his crop trundling roller-wise to market. The vehicle was
accommodated to a highway impassable by any ordinary means of
conveyance. In the present case, just as truly as then, the neces-
sity has its origin in causes independent of legislation. The neces-
sity operates universally. If it place individuals under a degree of
restraint, it not unfrequently inflicts utter ruin upon companies,
whose franchises it in effect afinihilates by sweeping away the cir-
cumstances to which they were adapted. The law neither lends its
aid to advancing science out of partiality. to corporations, nor will it
consent to shackle science for the sake of an illusory adherence to
any theory of private rights.
But the objection that tolls are taken in this peculiar form, being
waived, the difficulty is next started, that the corporation, besides
being both proprietor of the highway, like a turnpike company, and
possessor of an exclusive franchise as carrier, is also owner of the
freehold. This additional feature makes the case more unique, but
it brings no new difficulty in principle. There must be some owner
of the land. The objection vanishes immediately, if we suppose
the corporation divided into two-one the owner of the soil, the
other possessed of the franchise of maintaining a road and carrying
passengers upon it for toll; and there is no violence in the suppo-
sition, since a corporation is a mere artificial efitity, the creature of
State policy. This hypothesis leads to something better than a
hypothesis-to that which we started to seek, a natural and con-
sistent theory. What does the corporation own? The land. But
the usE of the highway, the common right of passing-no matter
upon what conditions-over that land :-what is this? An ease-
ment belonging, not to the corporation, but to those who enjoy it,
the public. The corporation, indeed, in the capacity represented
in the second of the two sub-corporations into which we just now
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supposed it divided, has the management of the easement, but the
latter does not therefore undergo any change of its nature.
The State vs. Rives was a proceeding on an indictment against
the purchaser of a portion of a railroad sold by the sheriff, on exe-
cution of a judgment against the company. The defendant had
begun to take up the rails, and to exercise the rights of an absolute
owner. The court, in affirming the liability of a railroad to execu-
tion, say: "Railroads, although publici juris in some respects, are
the subjects of private property, and it is in the latter character
that they are liable to be sold, unless forbidden by the legislature:
not the franchise, but the estate of the corporation in the land,
which is a distinct thing from the franchise."' It is not, then,
against the corporation considered as in the enjoyment of a mo-
nopoly as carriers, nor as vested with the franchise of taking toll
from those wko pass over the road, that execution is enforced, but
against it merely as the owner of the land.
If now the corporation existed in this latter capacity only, those
other powers and privileges having been vested elsewhere, in what
respect would the case be altered so far forth as the grounds of this
decision are concerned ? It would seem, not at all: the corporation
would still be there with its debts and would still be possessed of
that property which alone was levied upon. Yet now, the land be-
ing sold, how would the purchaser take it ? Subject unquestionably
to the easement; that is, nothing would pass but the barren fee. Let
us go a little further and consider what would be the condition of
another corporation, possessing all that the railroad corporation
possesses except the fee of the land. Suppose judgment entered
against this other body corporate-can the road now be levied on?
Clearly not.2  On what sound principle can this immunity of the
road, which is perfect so long as the fee and the franchise are kept
separate, be affected by the circumstance that the two capacities are
united-that the same corporation owns the barren fee (as a person
may own the soil of a turnpike road,) and is trustee for the public,
of the easement?
;; 13 S. & R. 210.15 Ired. R.
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The fact that the owner of the freehold receives a profit out of a
public easement does not in any way qualify the burden with which
the land is charged. The law of water courses furnishes an ex-
ample directly in point. While every stream, actually navigable is
prima facie a public highway, an unnavigable stream belongs, free
of any such servitude, to the proprietor of the banks. If the latter
put his stream in a condition to be navigated it does not thereby
become public ; but if he in addition to this, "purchaseth the king's
charter to take a reasonable toll for the passage of the king's sub-
jects and puts it in use, these seem to be devoting, and, as it were,
consecrating of it to the common use."' The fee remains as before,
but an easement has been established which no act of the owner of
the soil can put an end to. If then the railroad corporation stood
in the place of an ordinary owner of land, which is the most favor-
able supposition for the argument on the other side, its act in ob-
taining by charter from the State the license to take tolls would be
enough to vest in the public a permanent easement. When, in
carrying into effect this license, the corporation lays down rails, it
may not afterwards remove them, any more .than the owner of the
stream above mentioned may reduce it to its original condition and
render it unnavigable. Where rails were thus taken up by a com-.
pany, the court of King's Bench granted a mandamus to compel
their replacement. 2 It is evident that a grantee of the corporation
can have no larger right than the.corporation itself; as to the pub-
lic they occupy the same position. This receipt of tolls, however,
is but one of many circumstances going to show a dedication of the
road to the public.' The very authority to take the land was only
given in consequence of an engagement to devote it to this object.
A. W. M.
I Hale De Jere Maris 1. c. 8. 2 2B. & Ald. 646.
